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Abstract
Multipath communications at the Internet scale have been a myth for a
long time, with no actual protocol being deployed at large scale. Recently,
the Multipath Transmission Control Protocol (MPTCP) extension was stan-
dardized and is undergoing rapid adoption in many different use-cases, from
mobile to fixed access networks, from data-centers to core networks. Among
its major benefits – i.e., reliability thanks to backup path rerouting, through-
put increase thanks to link aggregation, and confidentiality being more diffi-
cult to intercept a full connection – the latter has attracted lower attention.
How effective would be to use MPTCP, or an equivalent multipath transport
layer protocol, to exploit multiple Internet-scale paths and decrease the prob-
ability of Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks is a question which we try to
answer. By analyzing the Autonomous System (AS) level graph, we identify
which countries and regions show a higher level of robustness against MITM
AS-level attacks, for example due to core cable tapping or route hijacking
practices.1
Keywords: MPTCP, Man-in-the-Middle attacks, communication
robustness
1. Introduction1
The Multipath Transmission Control Protocol (MPTCP) [24] is an ex-2
tension of TCP to concurrently use multiple network paths for a given con-3
nection. Among many proposals to support these features at the transport4
1A preliminary version of the content of this paper was presented in [43].
layer, it is considered as the one having attracted the largest interest and5
deployment [44]. One of the main reasons for this success is the incremental6
deployability adopted in its design, with the required signaling transparently7
reusing existing features of the TCP options.8
MPTCP employs multiple ‘subflows’ to route traffic from a source to a9
destination in an IP network via different network interfaces and/or TCP10
ports at the transmitting and/or receiving endpoints. Subflow IP traffic can11
then be routed independently in the network segment. However, besides12
the usage of multiple network interfaces at the source or destination, the13
presence of flow-level load-balancers sensible to port numbers, or multipath14
proxies aware of the network topology [8] can differentiate the route followed15
by the subflow packets.16
MPTCP is being adopted by major operating systems; it is already hap-17
pening for Apple OSX and IOS, where it is used for some applications. Its18
integration in the mainstream Linux kernel is expected for the upcoming ver-19
sions [48]. Among the motivations pushed forward in support of MPTCP,20
there are [40]: (i) bandwidth aggregation, i.e., the increased network band-21
width offered to a connection; (ii) connection reliability, i.e., the possibility22
to use an alternative path in case of failure along the primary path or at the23
primary network interface level; (iii) communication confidentiality, i.e., the24
decreased ability for a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacker to intercept all25
the traffic of a same connection.26
While the first two aspects above have been largely explored in the last27
decade, the latter was marginally studied to date. In this paper, we report the28
results of an extensive measurement campaign aimed at assessing the degree29
of confidentiality one can expect using MPTCP. In particular, we focus on30
confidentiality from large-scale, i.e., Autonomous System (AS) level, MITM31
interception, i.e., looking at the empirical probability that a single connection32
can be intercepted by an organization or an attacker able to capture all the33
traffic going through an AS on a given direction (most of Internet communi-34
cations being asymmetric). Such attacks can happen either by remote access35
to routing devices of an AS or even by Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)36
route hijacking. In our analysis, we focus on the case of MPTCP-capable37
source devices using two edge providers, analyzing measurement results on38
a geographical basis to identify which countries and regions MPTCP may39
grant higher confidentiality with respect to large-scale MITM threats.40
An important assumption of our analysis is that the MPTCP scheduler41
behavior of endpoints or multipath converters can be tuned so that it does42
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not only look for throughput maximization, but also for path diversity ex-43
ploitation for increased confidentiality, as investigated in [17]. Solutions44
offering programmability of the MPTCP scheduler are making surface, as45
notably [25, 16].46
It is worth noting that, despite we refer to MPTCP as our reference mul-47
tipath transport-layer protocol, our study can apply as well to other func-48
tionally equivalent protocols, such as for instance multipath QUIC (Quick49
User Datagram Protocol Internet Connections) [14].50
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a background on51
MPTCP and related security concerns. In Section 3, we describe our mea-52
surement methodology. Section 4 presents the results, different application53
scopes of this work are discussed in Section 5, and in Section 6 we conclude54
the paper.55
2. Background56
In this section we provide the necessary background on the MultiPath57
TCP (MPTCP) protocol and on Internet-scale Man-In-The-Middle (MITM)58
attacks.59
2.1. MultiPath TCP (MPTCP)60
MPTCP extends TCP and allows fragmenting a data flow from a single61
connection into multiple paths (subflows TCP) [24, 46], as illustrated in62
Figure 1. At the application layer, a connection appears as a normal TCP63
connection. At the network layer, each subflow looks like a regular TCP flow64
whose segments carry in their header a new type of TCP option [24]. The65
protocol improves the performance offered by a single flow and makes the66
connection more reliable using concurrent and redundant paths.67
Application
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Figure 1: Multipath TCP Connection: Overview
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The initial TCP connection handshake carries an option, the MP_CAPABLE68
option, to enable MPTCP capability discovery and subflow creation. The69
handshake can carry additional information, such as a cryptographic key70
employed to authenticate the end-hosts and set up new subflows [24]. The71
establishment of additional subflow may employ also a token and random72
numbers (nonces), to prevent replay attacks on the authentication method.73
Further, an additional address identifier may be employed to identify the74
source IP address of a packet. Hence, even if the IP header has been changed75
by a middlebox (e.g. NATs, firewalls), end-hosts can identify an address76
without any doubt or ambiguity.77
MPTCP can overcome some weaknesses inherent to TCP, achieving (i)78
a greater throughput, (ii) higher reliability, and (iii) higher confidentiality.79
Indeed, a multipath connection can improve the throughput aggregating80
bandwidth over different paths by concurrent data transmission across all81
available paths. Moreover, a multipath connection can quickly overcome82
one path failure by sending data to another available path, increasing the83
data delivery reliability [47]. Finally, fragmenting data flow across different84
subflows makes complete connection interception difficult because attackers85
would need to capture the transmitted content through all the subflows to86
build the content.87
Therefore, MPTCP can provide a greater level of confidentiality than a88
regular TCP transmission if the subflows of a connection are routed along89
disjoint paths: the higher the level of disjointedness, the higher the con-90
fidentiality guarantee, and furthermore the higher the level of robustness91
against such attacks. The goal of this paper is to precisely quantify the level92
of robustness in use-cases where MPTCP is adopted not (only) to improve93
communication performance or reliability, but (also) to improve confiden-94
tiality. When addressing this aspect, router-level path disjointedness can be95
considered as being too weak in particular against AS-level traffic capturing96
and route hijacking. This is the reason why we focus instead on a larger scale97
of path disjointness, i.e., AS-level path disjointedness, which do make sense98
in practical scenarios as elaborated here after. Running an analysis on an99
even larger scale than AS-level scale (e.g., regional or country level) would100
likely be either infeasible or not sufficiently realistic.101
2.2. Internet MITM Attacks102
In Internet-scale communications, MITM attacks can happen when the103
attacker gains access to all the traffic transiting through an AS, or at least a104
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portion of it that is enough to reconstruct the transmitted data. In practice,105
it can be possible by optical layer or BGP route hijacking MITM attacks.106
At the optical layer, an attacker is able to split cables by using fiber op-107
tical taps, as described in [58], with a low probability of being detected if108
peculiar strategies are adopted as explained in [27, 52]. Moreover, one can109
intercept the traffic by exploiting coupling and out-of-the-fiber light propa-110
gation phenomena [57], despite the fact that this is particularly challenging111
when performing wavelength-division-multiplexing.112
At the BGP layer, MITM attacks exploit the natural way BGP works,113
stealthily hijacking Internet routes to modify or capture the traffic before it114
reaches the destination. BGP-based MITM attacks have been quite deeply115
studied for about twenty years; in a recent survey [15] we have a detailed116
description of such attacks, their effects as well as mitigation and defense117
strategies.118
This type of attack gained special attention in 2008, when a major provider119
in central Asia hijacked Youtube traffic to apply local policies. In the same120
year, a practical BGP MITM attack was demonstrated during the DefCon121
hacking conference [3]: authors successfully intercepted traffic bound for the122
conference network and redirected it to a system they controlled before rout-123
ing it back to DefCon. A recent notable attack happened in 2014, attackers124
injected BGP routes to redirect traffic from Bitcoin miner nodes to a com-125
promised host [30]; it was estimated that at least $83,000 worth of Bitcoins,126
Dogecoins, HoboNickels, and Worldcoins were stolen over a period of four127
months. More recently, in 2017 all traffic heading to Visa, MasterCard and128
other service providers was hijacked for a short period of few minutes [54].129
The cost of such BGP incidents could be even more than what have been re-130
ported. Notable ones are documented in [29, 51]; often they are not reported131
because they cannot be always detectable, they have limited scope, last for132
a short time etc.133
At the transport layer, the advent of MPTCP raised new security specifi-134
cation questions and challenges [5, 6]. In [36], cryptography based solutions135
are proposed against eavesdropping. The authors in [6] present an analysis of136
residual threats in the MPTCP signaling and propose some fixes. Recently,137
an extension of MPTCP to secure multipath communications was proposed138
in [33], to offer authentication and encryption mechanisms not only to the139
connection but also to single TCP options. This prevents different types140
of MITM attacks where an attacker could force all the traffic to be sent141
only over the path under his control by hijacking the traffic and erasing the142
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Figure 2: Adopted measurement methodology
MP_CAPABLE option.143
In general, most of the works at the state of the art aim at either in-144
vestigating security threats for MPTCP or proposing solutions for them. It145
is worth mentioning the rising interest in using MPTCP to further enhance146
confidentiality when using Internet over-the-top Virtual Private Networks147
(VPN) services such as ToR and OnionCat [31]: MPTCP is used in the up-148
stream direction from the client to many gateways accessible via the VPN,149
on the way to the server, thus increasing the confidentiality level of the con-150
nection. Nevertheless, such practices can have a gain which can be hard151
to assess: how can you ensure the upstream source-destination traffic does152
follow disjoint paths, hence decreasing MITM efficiency, if not at the router-153
level, at the AS level? In this paper, for the first time at the state of the154
art to the best of our knowledge, and going beyond the preliminary study155
presented in [43], we attempt to provide a response to such questions.156
3. Methodology157
In this section, we first give a description on the datasets used for con-158
structing a representative AS-level graph of Internet, the basis for our anal-159
ysis. Then, we describe our approach for computing the number of valid160
vertex-disjoint paths between two arbitrary nodes over the constructed graph.161
Finally, we detail how we evaluate path diversity at different geographical162
scopes. The datasets we employed as well as our scripts are given in [41]163
for the sake of reproducibility. Figure 2 gives a schematic illustration of the164
different blocks of our measurement methodology.165
It is worth noting that our methodologies imply that there is a way for a166
single MPTCP connection to have access to the network path diversity, by167
means of ad-hoc signaling or specific APIs. Solutions exist in this direction,168
as described in [35, 18].169
6
3.1. Graph construction170
We extract 2015 AS-level BGP-derived routing data from [4], and couple171
it with the inter-AS relationship data [4] (i.e., indicating which AS is provider,172
client or peer in an inter-AS link)2. The result is a new dataset containing all173
the AS links along with their frequency of occurrence and relationship type.174
We choose this approach because, comparing with other resources [12] [32],175
the topological data from [4] revealed to be more reliable and able to cap-176
ture a broadened view of the Internet topology. Indeed, it integrates data177
not only from Routeviews [50], but also from other resources such as RIPE178
RIS [49]. It is worth noting that the alternative traceroute-based approach179
employed in [12] has known issues [45] when converting router-level paths180
into AS-level.181
Employing measurements over a long period allows us to capture inter-182
domain connection dynamics as well as inter-AS economic relationships. For183
instance, in a one month period, only 85% of inter-AS links appear more184
than 20 days, the remaining links with lower frequency of occurrence being185
those used for backup operations or during BGP convergence periods. For186
the sake of consistency, we removed these unstable links.187
3.2. Path diversity computation188
In order to have a measure of the path diversity, we need to enumerate all189
the paths connecting two nodes over a graph that satisfy given routing prop-190
erties. This problem is often referred to as policy-compliant path diversity191
computation in the literature [23, 37]. The common approach [23] to this192
problem is to convert the original graph into a type-of-relationship (ToR)193
graph [21], i.e., a directed graph in which (i) the relationship between two194
adjacent vertexes is expressed via the direction of the edge connecting them,195
then (ii) maximizing the total number of vertex-disjoint paths between nodes196
in this graph. However, the time-complexity experienced in such methods is197
relatively high hence intractable for a graph as big as the AS graph.198
In order to better scale, we introduce a novel path search algorithm lever-199
aging the scale-free characteristics [2] of the input AS graph (i.e., a graph200
with relatively few hubs capturing the majority of the paths) to optimize the201
2The inter-AS relationship data from [4] is extracted monthly from the Cyclops
database [20], which combines BGP data with Internet eXchange Point (IXP) data and
adopts inference techniques proposed in [45].
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execution time. In such a scale-free graph, the diameter (i.e., the length of202
the longest path among all the shortest paths) is not too high. Thus, the203
average path length (measured in number of AS hops) connecting any pair204
of nodes in the AS-level graph of Internet is around 5 as of today [38] (note205
that it is a bit lower with IPv6).206
Searching for paths in a scale-free graph, i.e., a graph with a large minority207
of hub nodes connecting the rest of the nodes, is a problem of controllable208
complexity when adopting breadth or depth-first search algorithms with a209
limited depth; indeed, fixing a limited depth to a graph search, and that for a210
scale-free graph that has a limited diameter, strongly decreases the number211
of explored branches in the graph exploration3. From the constructed AS212
graph G, the breadth-first search algorithm we describe in Alg. 1 can be213
applied to discover all the policy-compliant paths between two nodes s and214
d, in a reasonable time.215
Alg. 1 works as follows: (i) starting from the origin s, the algorithm216
explores every adjacent node n of s. (ii) A queue P is introduced to keep217
track of the explored paths; initially, it includes all the paths from s to n.218
(iii) Following these paths, the algorithm continues discovering the adjacent219
nodes to look for destination d. (iv) For a path p dequeued from P , the last220
node n is extracted, all of its neighbors are checked in sequence to determine221
the valid next hops towards d. (v) Once a neighbor is determined as valid,222
link to that neighbor will be added into the current path forming a new valid223
path toward destination. This new explored path is then enqueued into P for224
the next discovering phase. (vi) A node is considered as valid once the path225
through it does not violate the valley-free routing property [28]4; we express226
such policy-compliant path (i.e., a path that complies with the valley-free227
routing policy), using the following regular expression c2p ∗ p2p?p2c∗ [37] in228
which c2p, p2p and p2c denote the relationship between interconnected nodes229
(where ? means that you can have one or none p2p link).230
3breadth-first search explore first all the neighbors of a node, and then explore deeper in
the graph; depth-first search, instead, explore first in depth starting from a given neigbor,
and proceeds to the next neighbour only when the exploration in depth from the first one
has terminated.
4A valley-free path is defined as a path that does not cross more than one peering
agreements, which are agreements over which two ASes exchange only routes towards
respective customers, which is justified by the fact that peering agreement are meant to
be free-of-charge for both ASes
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It is worth noting that, within G links are labeled according to their231
inferred relationship. For example, assuming that n1, n2, n3 are neighbors of232
node s, in which s is customer (‘c’) of n1, provider (‘p’) of n2 and peer with233
n3; the links (s, n1), (s, n2), and (s, n3) are labeled as ‘c2p’, ‘p2c’ and ‘p2p’,234
respectively. With these labels, the regular expression for policy-compliant235
path then could be leveraged to determine the validity of next hop toward236
the destination. For instance, taking the customer-type neighbors among237
the neighbors of s (i.e., n2), and looking at their neighbors x in turn, those238
(n2, x) links are not validated if they are either c2p or p2p because a customer239
is not expected to grant transit towards its other provider(s) to one among240
its providers, and a customer is not expected to give access to its peer(s) to241
its provider(s). By checking the labels of links along the explored path, the242
validity of next hops can be determined. Once a valid path is discovered,243
it is enqueued into P for the next discovering phase. The same exploration244
and validation processes are repeated for all the paths in P until reaching245
destination d or the path length goes over a given threshold τ .246
The path validation executes at run-time to ensure that non-compliant247
paths are detected at the early stage, thus avoiding wasting time exploring248
invalid paths. By reducing the number of paths needed to be explored in249
the following phases, the search space is continuously optimized. Moreover,250
a proper choice of τ not only limits the time and space complexity, but can251
also avoid selecting long paths to be avoided in practice.252
As a result of the path search algorithm, policy-compliant paths between253
two endpoints may share common nodes. To get the final set of vertex-254
disjoint paths, we run a simple off-line filtering linear algorithm to capture255
the shortest disjoint paths. Since the original list of valid paths turned out256
to be quite small most of the time and already sorted, the complexity of such257
a filtering operation is negligible.258
3.3. Source-destination pairs259
Within the constructed AS-level graph, multipath connections could be260
simulated by simply attaching end-hosts as virtual nodes into AS nodes of261
the original graph. For instance, a multi-homed device can be emulated by262
adding a new node, then linking it with at least two AS nodes. The connec-263
tion from that node to any other virtual nodes forms a multipath transport-264
layer communication. Our approach for emulating multipath communication265
can therefore be simply referred to as a process of source-destination pair se-266
lection. In the following, we define the target set of AS nodes which we267
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Algorithm 1: Path Search Algorithm
input : source s, destination d, graph g
output: ValidPathSet
V isitedNodes←− ∅
queue.append([s])
while queue not empty do
path←− queue.pop()
v ←− path.LastNode()
if v /∈ V isitedNodes then
for n ∈ v.NeighborSet do
if n /∈ V isitedNodes and (label(v,n)=‘p2c’ or
label(v,n)=‘p2p’) then
for x ∈ n.NeighborSet do
if label(n,x)=‘c2p’ or label(n,x)=‘p2p’ then
g.RemoveEdge(n,x)
end
end
end
NewPath←− list(path)
NewPath.append(n)
if n = d then
ValidPathSet.append(NewPath)
end
if length(NewPath) = τ + 1 then break
queue.append(NewPath)
end
VisitedNode.add(v)
end
end
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consider for attaching the end hosts. A simulation process is then described268
in details explaining which communication scenarios are covered in our study.269
The current Internet ecosystem is composed of more than 70 thousand270
ASes, out of which the large majority are stub ASes, i.e., ASes that are only271
origin or destination ASes. About 13% are Tier-3 or small Tier-2 ASes, we272
arbitrary define in this paper as those appearing at most in the third from last273
position and at least penultimate position in BGP AS paths; we refer to such274
ASes as ‘edge provider’ ASes, which can be considered as a representative set275
of national Internet Service Provider (ISPs). Such ASes are often referred to276
as ‘eyeball’ ASes. In this paper, an edge provider AS is not a stub AS, but is277
rather expected to be a regional or national ISP, most of the time (rare are278
the cases where an international/intercontinental ISP gives Internet access279
to end-users).280
Rather than taking into account all possible communications, we tar-281
get the connections among hosts at the edges, performing connections us-282
ing multiple sub-flows such as done with MPTCP. Considering connections283
between hosts in different countries, we precisely address the MITM robust-284
ness of Internet connections crossing multiple ASes. To precisely determine285
which communications to cover in our study, we define a target set of source-286
destination pairs that address, in a reasonable yet arbitrary way, the commu-287
nications that may be more sensitive to communication privacy. Our choice288
of source-destination pairs is as follows:289
• the source is interconnected to two edge providers in a country.290
• the destination is not multi-homed, i.e., it is reachable via a single ISP,291
the one given by the best BGP path from each source edge provider,292
and belongs to an AS at another country than the one of the source.293
Figure 3 illustrates an example of how we simulate multipath communi-294
cations accordingly the above policy. For each two arbitrary edge provider295
ASes in a same country, one source is created (i.e., a dual-homed source).296
For each edge provider in another country, one destination is paired with297
the source. Such a pair dual-homed source - single-homed destination de-298
fines the two endpoints of a multipath communication. Listing all pairs, i.e.,299
combining a given source with every destination, all possible (international)300
communications of a dual-homed host can be covered.301
Besides reducing the number of pairs to a reasonable and treatable num-302
ber (requiring about one week of computation), it is worth noting that, in303
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Figure 3: Representation of the source-destination pair selection process.
such a way, we consider communication in a single direction: from source304
to destination. That is, under such a path election strategy, we cover the305
case when a multi-homed device uploads to a single-homed server, as well as306
the case when a single-homed device downloads contents from multi-homed307
servers.308
The scenarios that are not covered in our study include: (i) multi-homed309
devices downloading from single-homed server; (ii) single-homed devices up-310
loading contents to multi-homed servers; (iii) a multi-homed device commu-311
nicating with another multi-homed device. A dual analysis, quite expensive312
computationally, covering these additional cases may be performed as well313
in future works.314
3.4. MiTM robustness metric aggregations315
The ability to split traffic over different paths allows multipath protocol316
to realize MiTM attacks more difficult. Thus, the chance for an attacker to317
capture all the traffic sent by a source is reduced in proportion to the number318
of disjoint paths between the source and the destination. Path diversity is319
therefore a proper indicator to evaluate the MiTM robustness of a multipath320
communication.321
Rather than considering the robustness against MiTM attacks of every322
connection individually, we are more interested in evaluating such a robust-323
ness at the end-host level, thus measuring the degree of robustness offered324
by a multipath-capable source device to secure its data sending over the325
Internet.326
3.4.1. Source-specific MiTM robustness metric327
With regard to the aforementioned approach for source-destination pair328
selection, we define the source-specific MiTM robustness metric as the aver-329
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age number of disjoint paths over all the destination edge providers that are330
in a different country than the source. Such a metric can be considered as a331
level of unlikelihood that a MiTM attack takes place for that source config-332
uration; the higher the value of the robustness metric, the more difficult it is333
for an attacker to capture traffic from that source.334
3.4.2. Source country-specific MiTM robustness metric335
Aggregating results from all the sources within a given country we can336
obtain a source country-specific MiTM robustness metric. Such a definition337
allows us to characterize the robustness level offered by different source coun-338
tries to multipath communications.339
3.4.3. Country-level source-destination MiTM robustness metric340
As another way to aggregate the MiTM robustness metric computation,341
we also study a country-level source-destination based aggregation, i.e., lead-342
ing to a robustness metric for a pair of source and destination countries.343
Given a source (a pair of edge providers in a country) and a destination344
country, its MiTM robustness metric is defined as the average number of345
disjoint paths from the source over all edge providers belonging to the desti-346
nation country.347
3.4.4. Country-pair MiTM robustness metric348
By grouping together the results from all the sources within a source349
country, we can define the country-pair MiTM robustness metric for the350
corresponding pair of countries.351
3.4.5. Metric computation352
Let us more precisely characterize the aforementioned source-destination353
pair selection process with respect to the two MiTM robustness metric ag-354
gregations we study in the following, i.e., the source country-level one and355
the country-pair one. We segment the set of edge providers, E, in country-356
specific subsets, Ec, where c denotes a country in the set of countries C,357
i.e., E =
⋃
c∈C
Ec. We employ the AS-to-country mapping given by the CIDR358
Report [7]. Let us indicate with Ec˜ the restriction to a specific country359
c˜ ∈ C. Overall, for a given country c˜, the number of source-destination360
pairs is therefore equal to the number of pairs of edge providers for the given361
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country multiplied by the number of edge providers of other countries, i.e.362
|Ec˜| × (|Ec˜| − 1)
2
×
∑
c 6=c˜
|Ec| (1)
For a given source and destination countries, s and d respectively, the363
number of source-destination pairs connecting them is equal to:364
|Es| × (|Es| − 1)
2
× |Ed| (2)
Doing so, we target a lower bound, pessimistic analysis, since we only365
take into consideration international communications and we suppose the366
destination is not multi-homed. The filter we set on the destination enumer-367
ation allows us to target communications that may need a higher level of368
confidentiality due to their international connotation. Moreover, in this way369
we also avoid a huge bias potentially due to the fact that a large majority of370
the AS paths available at the national level are not visible in backbone BGP371
routing tables such as the Routeviews ones (typically because of Internet372
exchange points, as recently shown in [1]). We believe having a lower bound373
stand is more appropriate than an upper bound one, while allowing us to374
scientifically qualify the value of the relative trends.375
4. Results376
We report the results obtained for a set of 147 countries, i.e., those coun-377
tries from the United Nations statistics [56] that appear to have at least two378
distinct edge providers officially based in the country; this automatically ex-379
cludes Greenland territories, very small city-state countries, many African380
countries and Indonesia. The geographical coverage is given in Figure 5. In381
the following sections, we present the statistics for two different MiTM ro-382
bustness metric aggregations, the country source specific one and the country383
pair one.384
4.1. Source country aggregation385
Let us recall the measurement approach for source country-specific MiTM386
robustness analysis:387
• For each country, we generate all possible dual-homed sources, i.e., all388
possible pairs of edge providers.389
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• For each such source configuration, we compute the number of disjoint390
paths to each destination. For each edge provider that is a different391
country than the source country, one destination is generated.392
• For a given source, we compute its corresponding robustness metric by393
taking the average of the number of disjoint paths over all the destina-394
tions.395
• For each country, a series of MITM robustness metrics is hence gener-396
ated, one for each source.397
We characterize the resulting series using boxplot distributions (using a398
0.1% outliers threshold). We overlay over the boxplots the average of the399
corresponding series with a red square, order them with increasing averages5400
from left to right. We report the results in Figure 4, and with a geographical401
view in Figure 5. We express three different viewpoints:402
• device view (Figure 4a): the MITM robustness is computed with the403
source node integrated in the AS graph as an ‘artificial’ node, i.e., the404
path search algorithm finds the number of AS-disjoint paths from this405
source node toward the destination. It provides therefore a device view;406
obviously, in this view the upper bound of the robustness is 2, i.e., the407
number of edge providers used by the source.408
• edge provider view (Figure 4b): the MITM robustness is computed409
counting the number of disjoint paths from the first and the second410
edge provider, then decreased by those paths that share an AS hop.411
Taking into account such a view, we assume that additional AS paths412
can be made available to MPTCP subflows acting at the edge providers413
level, e.g., by forms of flow path steering and load-balancing.414
• differential view (Figure 4c): the differential robustness results, i.e.,415
the edge provider view robustness minus the device view robustness,416
computed for each source configuration individually. This view more417
precisely quantifies the gain achievable for MPTCP communications418
when inter-AS load-balancing is enabled at the edge providers.419
5Average values do include outliers.
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(a) device view (b) edge provider view (c) differential robustness view
Figure 4: MITM robustness distribution for 147 countries.
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The above viewpoints also reflect different levels of trust on the providers.420
That is, while the edge provider view assumes MITM attacks do not happen421
at the source and destination edge providers (i.e., there is a high level of trust422
on those providers), the device view assumes that attacks can happen at the423
source edge providers, hence revealing a low level of trust in source direct424
providers.425
(a) device view
(b) edge provider view
Figure 5: Countries covered with corresponding MiTM robustness distribution
As a general assessment, Figure 4 shows a distribution to be interpreted.426
For example, one could consider 1.5 as the rough threshold above which the427
likelihood of MiTM is to be considered low, and conversely high if lower428
than 1.5. Only about 5% of the countries show good chances of being ro-429
bust against MITM from a device viewpoint, while looking at the maximum430
instead of the average and median values one could speculate that careful431
choice of the edge providers could make the MiTM likelihood low for a ma-432
jority of the countries. From an edge provider viewpoint, this ratio grows to433
roughly 60%, and higher than 90% looking at the maximum, that is if the434
edge provider choice can be influenced by confidentiality concerns.435
Moreover, the average number of paths connecting a dual-homed node to436
international destinations has a significant variance depending on the origin437
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country. The average robustness ranges from 1 (and less) to 1.6 from a device438
viewpoint, and from 1 (and less) to 2.5 from an edge provider viewpoint.439
It is worth noting that the reason why some minimum, and even average440
values, are below 1, is the partial view over the Internet topology and the441
incompleteness of inter-AS relationship inference; in fact, these factors make442
some destinations unreachable (counted as 0 path), but we left the 0 values443
in the series to also give an index of the level of topology incompleteness444
for different countries. In any case, the boxplot median is a metric robust445
against such outliers to look at.446
In addition, observing the distributions in Figure 4, we can also remark447
that:448
• Within a country, a high inter-quantile range indicates that the path449
diversity strongly depends on how the two upstream edge providers are450
selected for the source.451
• The gap between the min and max robustness is another interesting452
fitness metric to observe. Some countries maintain a small gap (below453
1) while others have a very big gap (up to 2). In other words, the454
deployment of multipath transport-layer communications for securing455
international communications in some countries can statistically yield456
a much better result than in other countries, where this gap is smaller.457
Particularly interesting is the case of Angola (AO), Venezuela (VE) and458
Namibia (NA), with small robustness gaps, which may be correlated459
to the presence of inter-continental cables landing in or close to the460
country [11].461
• The median is mostly higher than the average in the device view, and462
lower than the average in the edge provider view. This is essentially463
due to outliers, counted in the average and not in the median.464
• From the edge provider viewpoint, the maximum value is higher than465
2 in the most of the countries, suggesting that with a proper choice of466
trusted source providers, one can adopt multipath communications to467
statistically expect high confidentiality for its communications. Par-468
ticularly alerting are the cases of Uzbekistan (UZ), Nepal (NP) and469
Lebanon (LB), with quite low maximum values.470
• From the device viewpoint, in most of the cases the maximum robust-471
ness is not higher than 1.6, both averages and medians are quite far472
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from the desirable target of 2. Hence, without the support of inter-AS473
load-balancing at source providers, path diversity from a dual-homed474
node is reduced significantly, indicating a non negligible probability of475
paths joining on the way to the destination.476
• Considering the differential robustness, we can remark that among the477
countries that have the lowest device view MITM robustness, those that478
could most benefit from inter-AS load-balancing practices are Mongolia479
(MN), Pakistan (PK) and Korea (KR). However, the majority of those480
countries with low robustness do not improve much the situation going481
from the device view to the edge provider view.482
Looking at macro geographical regions, many European countries seem to483
grant better security than countries in other regions. In order to look at con-484
tinental characteristics, the plots in Figure 6 show the boxplot results (with485
1% outliers) aggregated on a macro-region basis (a and c, sub-continental486
level) and on a relative position basis (b and d, in terms of seacoast and487
inland borders). We can remark that:488
• Western Europe appears to be the best off, followed by Northern Eu-489
rope and Northern America. In almost 50% of Western Europe coun-490
tries there can be 2 disjoint paths from the source edge providers to491
Internet destinations.492
• Central Asia shows the worst robustness, followed by Australia and493
New Zealand; the reasons are likely network centralization practices494
and geographical isolation. It is interesting to notice the relevant gap495
between Central and South-Eastern/Western Asia.496
• within Europe, Western countries do offer a better diversity over North-497
ern countries, and especially over Eastern and Southern countries. with498
a small range of variation and a high median value show the best result.499
• A high variance is recorded at Southern Asia, Northern Europe and500
Sub-Saharan Africa, which indicates high differences among the coun-501
tries within these areas.502
• We could not find a strong correlation between the relative continental503
position, and the robustness metric, yet a positive correlation exists,504
with countries at the boundaries of oceans, with inter-continental cable505
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landing and that are sea-oriented (most of the border on the coast)506
that offer higher robustness than fully internal and continental-oriented507
ones.508
4.2. Source-destination country pair aggregation509
As we may notice, the MiTM robustness level of a multipath communi-510
cation could be affected not only by the country where the communication511
starts but also by the choice of upstream providers at that country. Besides512
that, within a source country, the robustness level for different destination513
countries can significantly vary. To evaluate this latter aspect further, we514
perform a source-destination country pair aggregation.515
Over the set of 147 countries, we evaluate the robustness metric for 1547516
directional country-to-country communication pairs in which the MiTM ro-517
bustness metric for one pair is computed as follows:518
• For a given source country, we generate all possible dual-homed sources,519
i.e., all possible pairs of edge providers.520
• For each such source configuration, we compute the number of disjoint521
paths to each edge providers located in the destination country.522
• For a given source, we take the average of the number of disjoint paths523
over all the destinations to get its source-destination based MiTM ro-524
bustness metric.525
• For a given source-destination country pair, a series of MiTM robust-526
ness metrics, one for each source, is therefore created.527
In Figure 7, we report the CDF of the average MiTM robustness, for all528
the 1547 pairs. The high range of variation (between 0.4 and 6) shows us529
the big robustness gap between pairs. Only 20% of the country pairs show530
an average of two or higher. For the remaining pairs, approximately 73%531
of them have the average range from 1 to 2. The remaining 7% are country532
pairs with very low robustness, below one; besides the specific context related533
to a country pair, a factor behind such bad performance can be the already534
discussed topology view incompleteness.535
To better understand the impact caused by different destinations, we536
further characterize the top 147 and bottom 147 pair in the CDF distribution,537
i.e., roughly the top 10% and the bottom 10% cases. The results are presented538
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(a) device view: macro-regions grouping (b) position grouping
(c) edge provider view: macro-regions grouping (d) position grouping
Figure 6: MITM robustness metric with continental subregion grouping.
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Figure 7: CDF of average MiTM robustness for 1547 pairs of source-destination country
in Figure 8, where the country pairs in each group are ordered from left to539
right with an increasing average (the average do include the outliers). We540
report the MiTM robustness distribution of each pair using the boxplot (with541
0.1% outliers) overlaid with a red square representing the average.542
Figure 8a reports the MiTM robustness metric distribution for the top 147543
country pairs. The high inter-quartile range (IQR) with a pair highlights the544
strong impact caused by edge providers choice at the source to the robustness545
metric. Besides that, there are also some source countries, such as Morocco546
(MA), Madagascar (MG), Gibraltar (GI), Guam (GU), Jersey (JE), Namibia547
(NA), Liechtenstein (LI) and Belize (BZ), that suffer from the presence of548
only one edge provider pair; these countries result in pairs with a collapsed549
robustness point in the box. In addition, within these top 147 pairs, there550
are some destinations, like Namibia (NA), Guam (GU) and Belize (BZ),551
that appear to show high sensibility to the destination choice on the MiTM552
robustness.553
In Figure 8b, we report the results for the bottom 147 country pairs. The554
majority of them have Montenegro (ME) as the destination. The second555
destination is Republic of Congo (CG). That highlights again the impact of556
destination choice on the MiTM robustness level. Unlike the top 10% case,557
we see a small inter quartile range (IQR) for most of the pairs, showing that558
even a careful choice on the edge providers at the source country cannot559
improve much the level of robustness for such connections. In other words,560
regardless of the origin country as well as the choice of source edge providers,561
the possibility of employing MPTCP to secure the communications destined562
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(a) 147 most robust country
pairs
(b) 147 least robust country
pairs
Figure 8: MITM robustness distribution for the top and bottom 147 pairs of country (with
respect to their average MITM robustness)
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to, e.g., Montenegro and Republic of Congo is extremely low.563
Considering 1 and 2 as the thresholds for very low (zero) and high (suffi-564
cient) robustness, respectively, a source-destination pair can be classified as:565
(1) highly robust against MiTM if it has the average robustness level of at566
least 2, and (2) weak against the MiTM once maintaining the average of 1567
or lower.568
We visualize the country-to-country communications in these two classes569
by mapping them into a geographical map in Figure 9. To avoid too many570
lines, we first group countries with respect to their subregion, then converting571
these country-to-country connections into the corresponding subregion-to-572
subregion connections. Finally, the subregional connections are expressed573
using lines with different opacity reflecting the portion of country-to-country574
communications between subregions having the MiTM robustness level less575
than or equal to 1 as in Figure 9a, and equal to or higher than 2 as in Figure576
9b.577
In Figure 9a, we only show the connections between subregions when578
there are more than 30% of the country-to-country communications with a579
robustness metric of at most one. For subregion pairs with less than 30% of580
their country-to-country communications having a robustness metric lower581
than one, the connection lines are hidden. In other words, the lines point out582
the subregions where the deployment of MPTCP cannot offer any protection583
against large-scale MiTM attacks. As presented in the map, the area of Cen-584
tral Asia and Melanesia are the two subregions having the worst performance,585
most of their MPTCP communications with other subregions are classified586
as zero-robust. Thus, most of the subregions could not be benefit from the587
deployment of MPTCP to secure their communications with Central Asia.588
In the sub-regional view of the high robustness group presented in Figure589
9b, we show the connection lines between sub-regions with more than 50%590
of the country-to-country communications having robustness level of 2 or591
higher. In such a view, Micronesia and then Western Europe are the two ar-592
eas that outperform the others in term of MiTM robustness. As depicted in593
the plot, except for a few low connected regions, like Central Asia, Caribbean594
and Northern Africa, etc., most of the multipath communications from and595
to Micronesia can profit from a high level of robustness. It is worth noting596
that in the region of Micronesia, Guam is the only country covered by our597
study. The high robustness result captured for communications from and to598
this region is therefore directly related to the highly connected network in-599
frastructure of Guam being a crucial node in the Internet cable network [53].600
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(a) regions with more than 30% of country-to-country communications having at most one path
(b) regions with more than 50% of country-to-country communications having at least two paths
Figure 9: Regional view of the source-destination based MiTM robustness
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5. Practical aspects601
We focused our study on MPTCP-based communications. More precisely,602
it covers the following cases:603
• MPTCP capable endpoints : both source and destination, client and604
server (or vice versa), are MPTCP capable, and the MPTCP commu-605
nication is not filtered by middle-boxes. As argued in Section 3.3, the606
multi-homed endpoint can be either the server or the client.607
• MPTCP proxied endpoints : at least one endpoint is not MPTCP ca-608
pable, but the TCP communications are handled by MPTCP proxies,609
converting TCP packets into MPTCP packets and vice versa, as ex-610
plained in [8, 10], possibly routed via Internet disjoint paths as pro-611
posed in [19, 9]. The multipath conversion proxies can sit at endpoint612
premises (customer premises equipment for the client, hypervisor or613
middle-box at the server) or at the edge provider level borders.614
Besides MPTCP-based communications, other protocols offering Internet-615
scale multipath, connection flow-level load-balancing could also be covered616
by our study. The following protocols are either not deployed, or they have617
only undergone a limited deployment at the Internet scale so far; they are:618
• SCTP : the Stream-Control-Protocol (SCTP) [55] is another multipath619
transport protocol absolving the same function as MPTCP, but less620
deployed than MPTCP due to the limited retrocompatibility.621
• LISP : the Locator/Identifier Separation Protocol (LISP) [26] is able to622
perform inter-AS inbound load-balancing by means of encapsulation,623
routing locator mapping, and appropriate traffic engineering (TE) pol-624
icy configuration. LISP primary scope is the edge provider one, hence625
results with the edge provider view are readily applicable. Further-626
more, deployment of LISP as an intra-AS TE tool can also allow us627
to perform inter-AS multipath on the outbound direction as proposed628
in [42].629
• MultiPath BGP : in BGP, the routing decision process only allows us to630
take one route per network prefix. The selected path can be inefficient631
in terms of global routing. Recently, forms of Multipath BGP were dis-632
cussed in standardization fora, but finally not standardized; however,633
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some recommendations have been published [39], and implemented by634
some vendors (see, e.g., [34] and [13]). Such multipath mode can be635
adopted at the edge provider scope to enable load-balancing at the636
egress direction. Despite the study [22] on core routing tables reports637
that in 2010 multipath BGP was practically not used, speculations638
report that it is used by major cloud providers.639
The above protocols are a selection of those protocol communication con-640
texts where load-balancing can affect the AS-path selection. There are also641
other load-balancing protocols which can potentially influence the egress AS642
selection as well, as for instance in data-center environments. In the case643
of MPTCP communications, these protocols, operated at the edge provider644
view, are able to perform inter-AS load-balancing in such a way that the645
path diversity exposed in our edge provider view can be made available to646
MPTCP devices, hence giving them the full potential of MPTCP in terms647
of communication confidentiality and robustness against MITM attacks.648
Finally, additional multipath transport-layer protocols are making sur-649
face, as for example the already mentioned multipath extension to the QUIC650
protocol [14], nicknamed MPQUIC. As MPTCP that authenticates its op-651
tions to avoid interference from one path to the others as already discussed,652
MPQUIC also has a similar protection by default, because every control in-653
formation in QUIC is authenticated.654
6. Conclusion655
We explored in this paper how Internet path diversity could be exploited656
by means of multipath transport-layer protocols such as MPTCP, when look-657
ing at increased security against man-in-the-middle attacks. We focused on658
such attacks acting at the autonomous system level, and at the robustness659
of multipath communications in what appear as a reasonable configuration660
where at least one endpoint is multi-homed with two edge providers.661
We reported extensive, specific and aggregated results for most of the662
world countries and regions, looking at macro trends that could inspire fur-663
ther research in the area. Results show that, statistically speaking, a mul-664
tipath protocols such as MPTCP does not help in guaranteeing robustness665
against MiTM attacks hence high confidentiality, unless (i) the choice of666
the edge provider is carefully taken, or (ii) one can rely on inter-AS load-667
balancing features offered implicitly or explicitly by edge providers. Some668
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continental regions are strongly more robust than others, and there seems669
to be a positive correlation with inter-continental cable landing proximity.670
Moreover, the results show that there are countries surprisingly less well671
connected than one could think of, such as Northern America countries, and672
countries that are more obviously less robust against such attacks due to673
network centralization practices.674
It is worth mentioning that the methodology we propose to measure675
MiTM robustness could be instrumental also for other types of analysis. For676
instance, having a high MiTM robustness may also represent an increased677
sensibility to distributed denial of service attacks (DDOS), as the set of pos-678
sible sources not sharing a network bottleneck can be expected to increase679
with the AS-level path disjointness. This aspect may be object of further680
work.681
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